The United States has experienced rising immigration levels and changing source since the 1950s. The changes in source have been attributed to the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Act that abolished country-quotas and replaced them with a system that emphasized family reunification. Some believed that the Amendments would not change the "traditional" sources of US immigrants. Given this view, it seems all the more remarkable that the sources of immigration changed so dramatically. This paper isolates the economic and demographic fundamentals that determined immigration rates by source from 1971 to 1998 --income, education, demographic composition and inequality. The paper also allows for persistence -big US foreign-born stocks implying a strong 'friends and neighbors' pull on current immigrant flows. Specific policy variables are included which are derived directly from the quotas allocated to different visa categories. Parameter estimates from the panel data are then used to implement counterfactual simulations that serve to isolate the effects of immigration policy as well as source-country economic and demographic conditions.
Introduction
The United States has experienced rising immigration since the 1950s and this has been accompanied by a growing debate about its economy-wide impact. Observers have stressed the decline in the human capital content of recently arrived immigrants and have associated this with shifts in source country composition.
1 These have been dramatic.
Between the 1950s and the 1990s, the proportion of immigrants arriving from Europe fell from over half to just 15 percent, while those from Asia rose from 6 percent to 30 percent, and those from Mexico alone rose from 12 percent to 25 percent. A decline in the skills and schooling of successive immigrant cohorts relative to native-born Americans has been closely associated with the changing immigrant origin. Given this fact, it is surprising that there has been so little analysis of why immigrant source has changed so dramatically in such a short period of time. So, where have US immigrants come from, and why?
These changes in source have taken place mostly since the 1960s and they have been attributed to the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Act. Before 1965, quotas were set for the maximum number of immigrants from a given country. Since quota allocations were based on the 1921 immigrant stock, they strongly favored Europeans, especially those from Western Europe. Immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were restricted under a separate quota. The 1965 Amendments abolished quotas and replaced them with a new nondiscriminatory system that strongly emphasized family reunification as a criterion for admission. It was believed by some that this would still be consistent with the result that the bulk of immigrants would come from the "traditional" sources. Given this policy view, it seems all the more remarkable that the sources of immigration changed so dramatically. The interesting question is: why?
This paper offers new estimates of the determinants of immigration rates by source from 1971 to 1998. It isolates the economic and demographic fundamentals that determine immigration rates across source countries and over time. These are real incomes, education, demographic composition and inequality. The paper also allows for persistence in these patterns as they arise from the impact of the existing immigrant stock -big foreign-born stocks implying strong 'friends and neighbors' effects. Specific policy variables are included which are derived directly from the quotas allocated to different visa categories. Finally, the paper examines far more countries over a longer period than has been true of previous work on late 20 th century US immigration.
After outlining the course of US policy, we set out a model of immigration, which is then estimated on a panel of 81 countries for the years 1971 to 1998. Economic and demographic variables, the immigrant stock, and a series of policy-related variables all emerge as significant determinants of migration rates as predicted by the theory. These estimates are then used to conduct counterfactual simulations so as to isolate the effects of immigration policy as well as the role of 'convergence' and 'divergence' in source country economic and demographic variables. The results indicate that variables like relative income and education had substantial effects on the composition of US immigration, while persistence wore off quickly
Immigration and Immigration Policy
Changes in US immigration over the last 50 years are well known. As Table 1 shows, the overall number legally admitted rose from quarter of a million per year in the 1950s to nearly half a million in the 1970s and reaching close to a million in the early 1990s. The change in source composition has been even more dramatic. Europeans formed over half of the total in the 1950s, and the bulk of these were from Western Europe; by the 1990s, Western Europeans were a mere 5 percent of the total. Europeans had been an even bigger share in earlier decades: 62 percent in the 1920s and 92 percent in the 1900s. Canada and other so-called New World countries shared this long-term decline in relative and absolute numbers.
The counterpart to Europe's decline as an immigrant source has been the rise in less developed parts of the world. All less developed regions increased their US immigration shares between the 1950s and 1970s, but the trends since have varied considerably. While the Caribbean share reached its peak in the 1970s, and while the Asian share peaked in the 1980s, the shares from Mexico, Africa and Eastern Europe continued to increase. The recent rise in immigrants from Eastern Europe clearly reflects non-economic and non-demographic changes as that region undergoes political transition. Furthermore, even though the share of some regions has stabilized, the absolute numbers from those areas has increased.
These differences across countries and regions suggest that economic and demographic forces have been important. The golden age of Western European economic growth coupled with an ageing population has been associated with the collapse of European immigration. Declining trends from the 1970s in parts of Asia --first in East Asia and subsequently in South East Asia --also seem to point to economic and demographic fundamentals at work. Similarly, demographic pressure and lagging economic growth in Africa is associated with an upward trend, although from a low initial level. Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (2000) . 3 The 1924 Act set quotas based on the proportion of each nationality in the 1920, subject to an overall Eastern Hemisphere ceiling of 150,000. Wives and minor children of US citizens were exempt from the quota. Western Hemisphere natives were not subject to the quota, but the 'Asiatic Barred Zone' introduced by the 1917 Immigration Act was retained.
citizens were exempt from the quota. Within the quota limit, visas were allocated according to a system of preferences that gave up to 50 percent to those with special skills, up to 30 percent to parents of adult US citizens, and up to 20 percent to spouses and children of legal aliens. Twenty-five percent of unused visas under the previous categories were given to siblings and married children of US citizens and the remainder to immigrants outside the preference categories. Admissions of Western Hemisphere immigrants were not subject to a quota, but small quotas were allotted to countries in the Asia-Pacific Triangle. Under this system, the bulk of the visas subject to quota were allocated to European countries, and among these two thirds went to just two countries: Germany and the UK.
The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act contained a radical shift in previous policy. The 1965 legislation established a maximum quota of 20,000 for each Eastern Hemisphere country, subject to an overall ceiling of 170,000. Within the quota, visas were allocated according to a seven-category preference system, which gave 64 percent of visas to relatives of US citizens or residents, 6 percent to refugees, and 30 percent to employment-based categories. As before, children and spouses of US citizens were exempt from the quota. In addition, a ceiling of 120,000 visas was set for the Western Hemisphere, but without country quotas or a preference system.
4
This new system strongly favored family reunification over employment-based immigration. Indeed, family reunification had been the main entry mechanism for Eastern
Hemisphere immigrants even before 1965. Some lobby groups and their congressional sympathisers believed that while the new policy could be seen as non-discriminatory, the composition of the existing immigrant stock would nevertheless ensure that immigrants would largely come from the traditional European sources (Briggs, 1984, p. 69; Daniels and Otis, 2001, p. 43-4) . On the other hand, the abolition of the national origins system did represent an increase in the opportunities for immigration from non-European countries. The most important amendment to the post-1965 regulations came in the 1990
Immigration Act (effective 1992). This legislation introduced an overall quota of 675,000, divided into three classes. First, a total of 480,000 visas was allocated to family immigrants, with immediate relatives of US citizens coming under the quota for the first time. Within this total, a minimum of 226,000, allocated according to a four-part preference system, were
given to family-sponsored non-immediate relatives of US citizens and resident aliens.
5
Second, the 1990 Act increased the number of employment based visas to 140,000 (from 54,000 previously), under a five-part preference system. 6 Third, 55,000 visas were allocated on top of the overall quota for "diversity" immigrants --those from countries with relatively low immigration since 1965.
7
The current (and past) legislation provides different routes into the United States.
Differences among source regions in levels of economic development and immigration histories are reflected in the composition of entry routes. Table 2 illustrates these differences for 1998. Overall, just 12 percent of visas were issued under employment based preference 5 The maximum number of visas allocated to non-immediate family members is the difference between 480,000 and the actual number of visas issued to immediate relatives in the previous year, subject to a minimum of 226,000. Thus under the 'flexible cap' system the total number admitted under the quota can exceed the overall cap in a particular year. 6 The quotas for different preferences in the employment-based category are detailed in Appendix 2D. 7 In the transitional period between 1992 and 1994, the overall quota was raised to 700,000 with Immigration is determined partly by individual incentives and constraints, and partly by policy. Immigration policy can be seen as a filter though which ex ante migration decisions are translated into ex post migration. The economics of the migration decision has been widely studied, most notably by Larry Sjaastad (1962) , George Borjas (1987) and Barry Chiswick (2000) , as well as by Hatton and Williamson (1998) for the European Mass migrations before the 1920s. Here we set out a heuristic framework which follows in that tradition. It emphasizes the roles of income differentials, skill differentials, migration costs, demographic at-risk sensitivity, and immigration policy on the probability that individuals will move from one country to another. Second there is a direct cost, c 1 , which is the same for all migrants from source country y, but which may differ across source countries according to distance from the destination. Third there is the cost to migration associated with quantitative restrictions on immigration: the greater is the total quota, q, the lower is the cost, in terms of waiting time, or the cost and effort of moving to a higher preference category. Thus the cost-equivalent effect of quotas is represented by, c 2 (q), which applies to all potential migrants, given their status under the quota. Finally, skill-selective immigration policy is represented by a term γ(δ − s i ); the higher the individual's skill-level, relative to benchmark level γ, the lower are the costs of migration. A rise in δ increases the overall standard for admission, while an increase in the skill-selectivity of immigration policy, for a given threshold, is represented by an increase in the parameter γ.
Putting these elements together, the probability that individual i will migrate from country y to country x, m i , is:
Across individuals in country y, w x (s i ), w y (s i ), z i , and s i are assumed to be normally distributed with means µ x , µ y , µ z , and µ s respectively. Summing over all n individuals in the source country y, the emigration rate to x is:
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function and σ v is the standard deviation of the net benefit function v.
Higher mean wage rates in the destination country or lower mean wage rates in the source country (for a given skill level) increase the migration rate, as does a fall in the mean of personal migration costs, µ z, or a fall in the fixed migration cost, c 1 . An increase in the average skill-level in country y would increase the migration rate if there is skill selective immigration policy in country x (γ > 0), and could increase the migration rate through the wage differential, if the function w x is steeper than w y . The variances will also matter and the effect of changing wage and skill distributions will depend on their effect on σ v , and the sign of the mean of −v, the numerator in equation (2). Even for a given value of v, migration will be a non-monotonic function of the relative return on skills in the source and the destination.
These effects are examined further in Appendix 1.
Immigration policy will also influence the volume of migration through different channels represented by the terms in equation (2). Widening of family reunification policies, by reducing z i for some potential emigrants, will lower its mean µ z , and increase migration. A reduction in the overall quota, q, would raise direct migration costs through −c 2 (q) and therefore reduce migration. An increase in skill selectivity through raising the threshold value, δ, would be expected to reduce the migration rate while the effect of increasing the value of γ could raise or lower the migration rate (see Appendix 1).
Since migration is a forward-looking decision, it is useful to think of the gains to migration in present value terms. Thus w x (s i ) and w y (s i ) can be thought of as discounted income streams for individual i in the destination and source respectively. For any individual the present value of migration as represented by the difference between these income streams, net of costs, will depend on the length of working life remaining. Hence the net gain represented by equation (2) will be greater the younger is the potential migrant in the source country. It follows that the source country age structure should also matter: the larger the share of young adults the greater will be the migration rate for a given positive wage gap, net of costs.
8

Explaining Immigration
Recent studies of US immigration highlight some of the economic forces that determine immigration rates across source countries. The dependent variable is typically taken as the number of immigrants to the US relative to the source country population, representing the propensity to emigrate to the United States. Borjas (1987) found that, for a cross section of average emigration rates 1951-80, migration was negatively related to origin country income per capita and to distance from the United States. In addition, the emigration 8 Let the wage difference (destination minus source country) per year of working life be a constant D. If the age range of potential working-age migrants, a, runs from 20 to 65, and the discount rate is r, then the present value of the gains will be:
, which is a decreasing function of a.
rate was negatively related to inequality in the origin country. Using a cross-section of source country immigration rates for 1982-6 Philip Yang (1995) confirmed the income effects but found the stock of previous immigrants to be the single most important determinant.
More recently, David Kamemera, Victor Oguledo and Bobby Davis (2000) used panel data on emigration rates for the decade 1976-1986, including a wide range of explanatory variables for both the United States and countries of origin. They found that emigration rates were negatively related to distance from the United States and to origin country income, positively to US income and negatively to the US unemployment rate. In addition, they found that migration was positively related to measures of political rights and individual freedom in source countries, and negatively to political instability. Thus, their results confirm the importance of economic variables, migration costs and civil rights in determining migration. Immigration policy in the US was modelled as a dummy variable only.
In order to study the effects of policy change, Guillerma Jasso and Mark Rosenzweig and James Smith (2000) modeled male immigrants admitted as husbands of US citizens over the period 1972-90. They argued that this category, which was not subject to the quota, was nevertheless influenced by immigration policy, both directly, due to tightening eligibility conditions, and indirectly, as the result of substitution across visa categories. In addition to income and education, policy dummies were found to matter. In particular, application of the preference system raised the numbers arriving as male spouses from the Western
Hemisphere, while the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 reduced the numbers.
Previous studies have contributed much, but they suffer a number of shortcomings.
First, they either use country cross sections, or cover a limited number of years in time series, or only explore a subset of all immigration. We think there is an advantage to being more comprehensive: by covering emigration regions in decline, ascension, and transition we are more likely to identify the economic and demographic fundamentals driving changing immigrant source. Second, a number of key variables stressed by theory are often omitted.
Among these are the age structure of population and measures of human capital and/or the return to skills. Their omission makes it impossible to assess the role of sending country demographic and human capital attributes, variables that theory suggests should matter.
Foremost among these might well be the sending country's position in the demographic transition. Third, despite the obvious importance of "chain migration" effects, which have been greatly reinforced by family reunification policies, proxies for these effects -like the resident immigrant stock --are often omitted from the analysis. We believe this is a mistake since only by doing so can we isolate the role of persistence in the immigration flows.
Finally, shifts in immigration policy are typically reflected by time dummies rather than by variables that take full account of changes in the size and structure of quotas, and to whom they apply.
We attempt to capture the determinants of the emigration rate to the United States in the following specification:
(mig/pop) j,t = β 0 + β 1 (y j /y us ) t + β 2 (syr j /syr us ) t + β 3 age j,t + β 4 (ineq j /ineq us ) ,t + β 5 (ineq 2 j /ineq us ) 2 ,t + β 6 dist j + β 7 land j + β 8 eng j + β 9 (stock j,t-1 /pop jt ) + β 10 X r,j.t (stock j t-1 /pop jt ) + β 11 X e,j,t (syr j /syr us ) t + β 12 X d,j,t + β 13 X a,j,t civ j,t
The left-hand side variable is migration to the US from country j in year t as proportion of the source country population.
Economic and demographic fundamentals are reflected by the first five terms while the others represent costs. The first term, the ratio of the average (purchasing power parity adjusted) income in j relative to the United States is expected to have a negative effect; β 1 < 0. The second term is the ratio of average years of schooling (syr) in j relative to the US.
Since the income variable reflects both the amount of human capital and the average return on human capital it must be 'deflated' by human capital stocks in order to reflect the relative return alone. Thus, relative schooling years is expected to have a positive effect on immigration; β 2 > 0. The variable "age" in the origin country is the share of population aged 15-29. It reflects the fact that the present value of migration is higher, for a given wage incentive, at younger ages: thus, β 3 > 0. The ratio of inequality in the origin relative to the US (ineq) is entered in quadratic form. According to the Roy model, when the destination country is richer than the source (adjusted for migration costs) the effects of inequality will be non-monotonic. When the source country has a relatively unequal income distribution, an increase in its relative inequality will reduce the migration rate. When the source country has a relatively equal distribution, an increase in its relative inequality will increase the migration rate (see Appendix 1). Thus the effect of relative inequality on migration will be an inverse 'U' shape; hence β 4 > 0, β 5 < 0. Here inequality is represented by the gini coefficient of household income.
Migration costs constrain the move. As in any gravity model, these costs rise with distance from the US; hence, β 6 < 0. Such costs are also associated with whether the source country is landlocked and whether it is predominantly English-speaking; β 7 < 0, β 8 > 0.
Current migration costs are also represented by the stock of previous immigrants from the sending country. This is defined as the ratio of the number born in country j residing in the US at time t-1 relative to the population of country j. Since relatives (and friends) abroad reduce migration costs, β 9 > 0.
The remaining variables represent the effects of immigration policies, through the different routes of entry. These are interacted with other variables to represent the ease of access to these channels for migrants from a given country. The variables X r , X e , X d , and X a represent the number of visas available by different entry routes, divided by the total population of the countries that qualify for them. These are derived separately for each major channel of entry, and are calculated for each country, as described in Appendix 2D. This reflects the scarcity of visas and hence the cost of immigration. A fall in X as a result of a reduction in the quota will therefore reduce migration; thus β 10 through β 13 are expected to be positive.
The variable X r represents the quota for non-immediate relatives and it is interacted with the immigrant stock divided by origin country population. Thus, the higher the stock of foreign born from a given country, the lower the average cost of migration from that country, and the more migrants choose that route. X e represents the quota of employment visas and is interacted with the ratio of schooling years to capture the element of skill selectivity. X d reflects the quota of diversity visas available since 1992, prior to which it takes the value of zero. Since diversity visas are awarded by lottery, it is not interacted with country characteristics. X a represents the allocation of visas to refugees which since 1980 has been set year by year rather than coming under the legislated quota. This variable is interacted with a dummy for civil war --the main cause of refugee flights (e.g. Hatton and Williamson 2001) .
The final two variables represent somewhat special circumstances. X irc is intended to capture the effects of the IRCA legalization program. It is the estimated number of illegal immigrants from a given country residing in the United States preceding the legalization program divided by that country's population. It is applied only to the years 1989-91, when the bulk of legalizations took place, and β 14 is therefore expected to be positive. Finally, X b is a dummy for the years 1995-8 when, due to administrative changes in the processing of visa applications, there was a progressive rise in the backlog. As a result, recorded immigration for these years was lower than it would otherwise have been, and the dummy is therefore expected to be negative; β 15 < 0. Details of the derivation of these variables are given in Appendix 2D.
Econometric Results
We estimate our migration model on panel data for immigration to the United States is calculated from data collected by the World Bank and the WIDER Institute. These sources are further detailed in Appendix 2C. The stock of foreign born from each source country is calculated using benchmark figures from census and CPS data and then interpolating using gross immigration flows in order to obtain annual series. The sources and methods of calculation are discussed in Appendix 2B.
Our estimating equation is based on equation (3) but, because the gross immigration rate is bounded at zero, the left-hand side variable is transformed by taking natural logs. The right hand side variables are as in equation (3). We also include fixed effects for nine geographical regions (not reported in Table 3 ). These are assumed to capture, among other things, the availability of alternative migrant destinations, since third country effects are not included in the model. We also include separate dummies for the border states, Canada and Mexico.
The results from estimating the equation on this pooled cross section/time series dataset appear in Table 3 . The first column excludes the immigrant stock variable and all the policy related variables. All the explanatory variables are significant with the expected signs and they account for nearly three-quarters of the variation in the dependent variable. When, 9 Later versions of this paper hope to use the ILO ppp-adjusted and occupation-specific wage data base currently being made ready for public use (Freeman and Oostendorp 2000) .
in the second column, the (lagged) immigrant stock is added the coefficients of the other variables are somewhat attenuated, as might have been expected, but not by much. The full model appears in the third column and, while the coefficients of the other variables are little altered, most of the policy-related variables also enter strongly and with the expected signs.
The only exceptions are the variables representing refugees and the processing backlog, which although taking the expected signs, are not significant. Additional variables such as an index of source country civil rights or the US unemployment rate failed to provide significant coefficients and so these were excluded throughout. an inequality ratio typical of South America to one typical of Western Europe (from 1.20 to 0.82) reduces a country's immigration rate by 34 percent--a sizeable effect. This is because, for a given mean income, the lower is inequality in the source country (and therefore the lower is the return to skills) the less likely the low-skilled will have an incentive to migrate.
The variables reflecting fixed country characteristics are very powerful. The effect of distance is to reduce a country's migration rate to the US by about 21 percent for every additional thousand miles from the United States. The effect of being landlocked reduces a country's immigration rate to the US by 32 percent while the effect of being a predominantly English speaking country raises it by a massive 120 percent. While these fixed characteristics will always have an influence on the composition of US immigration, they can not have The policy-related effects are also important in the regression, but these are best treated by means of simulations in the next section.
The Impact of Immigration Policy
10 Modest especially given that the stock effects do not fully account for immigrants entering on visas either under family preferences or not subject to world-wide numerical limits. In 1998 immigrants in those visa categories amounted to about 20 per thousand of the total foreign-born stock.
The impact of immigration policy is assessed by means of counterfactual simulations relative to a baseline simulation. These simulations provide an important check on the model as well as a gauge of the effects of policy. Dynamic simulations are made for each of the 81 countries in the dataset using the estimated equation in the third column of Table 3 Between 1991 and 1992-4 that total rose by 18 percent, a figure that is just a little under our estimate of around 21 percent for 1992-4.
One reason that the increase in predicted (and actual) immigration was less than in proportion to the increase in the overall quota is that some previously exempt categories were absorbed into the quota for the first time. Specifically, these were immediate relatives and certain categories of employment-based immigrants. A second possible reason is that, in some years, the employment and diversity categories under-fulfilled their quotas.
Sources of Changing Country Composition
As we have seen, one of the major features in the evolution of US immigration in the last thirty or forty years has been the change in the source-country composition. That immigrant composition has also altered the composition of the stock of foreign-born. The and for the immigrant stock in 1997 are listed in Table 5 . These counterfactuals examine the effects of 'convergence,' a term that has a precise meaning here: a given variable is set at the mean for each country for each year. This counterfactual deals only with the demographic and economic variation between source countries and makes no change in the mean value of the explanatory variables in any year. The total volume of immigration is thus kept approximately constant, keeping the counterfactual in line with the overall immigration policy constraint 12 The simulation is complicated by the presence of persistence and the friends and neighbors effect. That is, for each country, a change in one of the explanatory variables must be allowed to feed into next year's foreign-born stock, which then influences the following year's immigration. The third column of Table 5 shows the effects of assuming that each country had the world average years of education and the effects are even more dramatic. Table 6 shows the result of a simulation, again starting in 1971, where the stock of Europeans in 1970 is cut by half and that of all other source countries is doubled. As compared to the baseline simulation in Table 5 , regional shares of the total immigration flow over the three decades had changed-but not by very much. Thus the friends and neighbors effect appears to have played a minor role in influencing immigrant composition across the decades.
One reason why these persistence effects seem relatively weak is the difference in the rate at which the foreign-born stock "depreciates" across sending countries. The immigrant stock for each country is constructed as S t+1 = M t + dS t , where S t is the stock at the beginning of year t and M t is the flow during that year. The parameter d (see Appendix 2B), reflects the balance of deaths, return migration and illegal immigration. This is much lower for Europe where the average value is 0.97, than it is for Central America and Mexico where the average value exceeds one. The difference is explained partly by the fact that Europeanborn populations are older and partly because there is more return migration among
Europeans. Most importantly, however, the difference reflects a much higher incidence of illegal immigration from countries south of the United States border.
The effects of applying the mean depreciation rate, d, for each year to all countries is shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 6 What conclusions emerge from the simulations that were performed using the coefficients from the estimated equation? The first is that between 1971 and 1998 immigration policy had powerful effects on the volume and composition of US immigration.
This conclusion is hardly surprising, but it is reassuring confirmation. The second is that experiments with economic and demographic fundamentals suggest that all of these worked in the expected direction. Taken together, the evolution of those fundamentals has had a profound impact on the source country composition of immigration filtered as it is through policies and quotas. 15 Furthermore, this paper has found that the effects of the migrant stock, though highly significant, are too small to have imposed a high degree of persistence in immigration patterns across the decades. Observers in the 1960s, who thought that a policy emphasis on family reunification would serve to replicate the structure of immigration, have been proved wrong. We can see why: the persistence effects working through the foreignborn stocks simply have not been large enough to matter all that much.
Strong US policy effects and powerful economic and demographic influences in sending regions -as well as weak persistence --are only part of the story reported here.
These forces have changed in the past and will change in the future. But fixed effects were also very influential in determining the composition of US immigration, such as distance and proximity -forces that have been manifested by illegal immigration pressure from south of the border. Thus, it seems likely that immigration from Central and South America would have been sizeable under almost any plausible set economic and demographic trends in those countries.
The national origins systems introduced in the 1920s was important in determining subsequent sources of US immigration. While it may seem surprising that the origins system lasted until as late as 1965, perhaps the explanation is that the underlying economic and demographic fundamentals had changed very little in sending regions until the 1960s.
APPENDIX 1 Migration and Selection
This appendix provides a fuller derivation of equation (2) in the text and it illustrates the effects on migration flows of changes in relative inequality between source and destination countries. Here we ignore the effect of age on the net present value of migration and examine the migration decision for individuals for a given age.
In the source country, y, skill endowments follow a normal distribution: s ∼ N (µ s , σ s 2 ). The incomes that individual i (i = 1, …, n) receives at home in country y, and would receive if he/she were to migrate to country x, are: Income in destination: w xi = α x + β x s i , distributed as w x ~ N (µ x , σ x 2 ). (A1) Income in origin: w yi = α y + β y s i ; distributed as w y ~ N (µ y , σ y 2 ).
Thus incomes, and income inequality, differ in origin and destination but incomes in x are perfectly correlated with those in y across individuals in the origin country. This simplifying assumption could be relaxed without qualitatively altering the results, provided that cov (w x , w y ) is sufficiently positive (see Borjas, 1987, p. 533) .
As discussed in the text the cost elements are the following. Individual-specific migration costs, z i , follow a normal distribution, z ∼ N(µ z , σ z 2 ), with mean, µ z , and variance σ z 2 , where z is independent of s (Cov (s,z) = 0). The constant cost elements, c 1 − c 2 (q), are the same for all potential immigrants. The cost associated with the skill-selective element of immigration policy is γ(δ − s i ), where δ is a threshold or benchmark skill level.
As shown in the text, the probability that an individual, i, will migrate from country y to x, m i , is:
Summing over all n individuals in source country y, the emigration rate to x is:
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function.
The standard deviation of v, can be written as:
The effects of changes in income distribution and in the selectivity of immigration policy depend on the sign of the numerator in the bracketed term in (3) as well as on the sign of the derivative of σ v with respect to σ x , σ y , and γ. The following table gives the conditions for these effects to be positive on total migration, holding the underlying skill distribution constant.
TableA1.1 Effects of Income Distribution and Immigration Policy on Migration
Effect on migration rate of:
Destination is "relatively rich":
Destination is "relatively poor":
We examine the case where destination country income exceeds source country income adjusted for migration costs (µ x > µ y + µ z + c 1 − c 2 (q) + γ(δ − µ s ), and assume γ is small. For a source country that is initially relatively equal (σ y < σ x − γσ s ) rising inequality will increase immigration up to the point where , beyond which immigration will decline. The effect of changing inequality in the destination is the exact opposite. Thus the immigration rate is an inverse U shaped function of the ratio of source to destination inequality. Note also that, in the presence of selective immigration, the peak immigration rate will occur at a point where the inequality ratio exceeds 1.
These effects are illustrated in Figure A1 .1 Figure A1 .1
The figure shows wage earning profile, w(x), for the destination and three alternative profiles, w(y), for the source country. The source country profiles are net of migration costs and they intersect at a mean income level that is lower than the mean of w(x). When source and destination profiles are parallel, as in w(x) and w(y)1, then all individuals in the source country (with sufficiently low z) have an incentive to migrate. If the source country has a more equal income distribution, as in w(y)2, then low-skill individuals for whom w(y)2 > w(x) will not migrate and total migration will be lower than previously. In the case where the source country is more unequal than the destination, as in profile w(y)3, migration will also be lower than in the case of parallel profiles, and migrants will be negatively selected. These relationships will be shifted by skill-selective immigration policy. This is equivalent to steepening the slope of w(y) in Figure A1 .1, at the same time as shifting the profile down at the median skill level. Increasingly selective policy always increases the positive selection of immigrants, and could increase migration, an effect that is more likely the lower is inequality in the source country and if http://ferret.bls.census.gov/cgi-bin/ferret. Since the 2000 census figures were not yet available at the time of writing, the only source of post-1990 foreign-born stock values is the Census Bureau's annual Current Population Survey (CPS) March demographic supplement. A description of the survey's methodology is available online at http://www.bls.census.gov/cgi-bin/dms?Folder=657. The CPS uses a system of supplemental weights to estimate nationwide foreign-born stock values from the information it collects from its sample. Although the CPS data are useful for displaying demographic trends, the small sample size makes the estimates highly variable. Furthermore, CPS data is only available after 1994 (and up to 1998) . To fill out our data set, we used the 1990 census values and the 1994-1998 CPS data to estimate a simple sourcecountry-specific regression against time. The regression was then used to generate predicted foreign-born by source country for 1998.
Interpolating Between-Census Years
In order to obtain annual estimates of the foreign-born stock by country, we interpolate between the benchmarks established obtained from the census or calculated from the CPS, using the following stock adjustment equation:
S t+1 = M t + dS t where S t is the stock at the beginning of year t and M t is the flow during that year. We use the gross flow series by birthplace (as defined above) in order to update the stock. Thus, for example, the stock observed midway though a year is updated with the flow beginning in that year but carrying through to the next year.
As noted in the text, the parameter d reflects deaths, return migration and illegal immigration, which subtract or add to the stock independently of the additions through gross immigration and hence 1 -d is the rate at which the stock 'depreciates'. This depreciation rate is calculated for each interval between census or CPS benchmarks using an iterative procedure beginning with S t , such that the value of S t+10 obtained by cumulating forward is reconciled with that of the next census benchmark. Thus there is a different value of d for each country for each interval between benchmarks. However, in some cases no census estimate was available for 1970; in that case the value of d calculated for the 1980-1990 interval was used, together with the gross migration series, to extrapolate back to 1970. Similarly where it was not possible to construct a benchmark figure for 1998 using the CPS data, we use the 1980-90 value of d to extrapolate forward to 1998.
C: Economic and Demographic Variables
[to be added]
D: Immigration Policy Variables
Immigration policy is characterized in equation (4) in the text by a series of variables denoted by X. The X's are variables reflecting the quota limits that are interacted, where appropriate, with different variables representing country characteristics. The derivation of the X's for each category is detailed below:
Non-immediate relatives: (X r )
Non-immediate relatives enter under the following preference categories in the post 1990 legislation (with total numbers in parentheses): (1) adult married children of US citizens (23,400); (2) spouses and unmarried children of US residents, 75 percent of whom must be minors (114, 200) ; (3) married children of US citizens (23,400); and (4) siblings of adult US citizens (65,000). Before 1992 the preference categories were broadly similar (with percentages of total quota in parentheses): (1) unmarried children of US citizens (20%); (2) spouses and unmarried children of resident aliens (20%); (3) married children of US citizens (10%); and (4) siblings of US citizens (24%).
The total number of visas available for these categories is calculated as follows: Eastern Hemisphere 1966 -78: 170,000 World 1979 -81: 214,600 Western Hemisphere 1966 -76: 120,000 " 1981 -91: 210,000 " " 1977 -78: 88,800 " 1992 -94: 281,000 " 1995 ,000 Note that until 1976 there were no preference categories for the Western Hemisphere and so the entire quota is included under this heading. For 1977-8, when a preference system was in force, the number is the total quota net of employment and refugee categories. From 1992 the figure is calculated as the total quota net of employment, diversity, and immediate family categories plus the floor of 226,000 for non-immediate relatives.
The variable X r is the total number of visas divided by world population and that value is applied to each country. Before 1978 it is calculated to produce a separate value for each hemisphere by using respective hemispheric populations.
Employment visas: (X e )
From 1992 the employment-related visas are given under the following categories (with total numbers in parentheses): (1) individuals of outstanding ability (40,000); (2) professionals with advanced degrees or with exceptional abilities (40, 000); (3) skilled workers or unskilled shortage workers (40,000); and (5) special occupations including religious workers (10,000); (6) investors (10,000). Before 1992 there were just two employment categories (with percentage of quota in parentheses): (1) exceptional professional, scientists and artists (10%); (2) skilled and unskilled workers in shortage occupations (10%).
The total number of visas for these categories is calculated as follows: Eastern Hemisphere 1966 -78: 34,000 World 1979 : 58,000 Western Hemisphere 1966 -76: 0 " 1980 : 56,000 Western Hemisphere 1977 -78: 24,000 " 1981 -91: 54,000 " 1992 ,000 The variable X e is the total number of visas divided by the world population. Before 1979, it is calculated to produce a separate value for each hemisphere by using respective hemispheric populations.
Diversity Immigrants: (X d )
The diversity category was introduced for the first time in the 1990 Immigration Act. Diversity visas are a special category introduced to apply to countries that were underrepresented in US immigration following the 1965 Amendments. Countries eligible for diversity visas are those with less than 50,000 immigrants in the preceding five years. In the period 1992-4, 40,000 (AA-1) visas were available and these were awarded among the applicants by lottery. For those years the list of eligible countries comprised mainly Europe (excluding the former Soviet Union), Canada and a few other countries. Within this list there was a quota specific to Ireland with the rest distributed among the other eligible countries. From 1995 55,000 (DV) visas were available and the list of eligible countries includes most of the world, with a few specific exceptions. For these years the total allocation was divided into quotas by continent, with no specific country quotas and a per-country ceiling of 7 percent of the worldwide total.
The variable X d is defined only for 1992-8 and only for those countries eligible to participate; otherwise it takes the value of zero. For 1992-4 it is defined for each participating country as the total number of non-Irish visas available divided by the total population of countries eligible to participate, excluding Ireland. The variable for Ireland is the Irish quota divided by Irish population. For 1995-8 it is calculated by continent and applied to each eligible country within that continent.
Refugees and Asylees: (X a )
Refugees and asylees were integrated in the total quota until the 1980 Refugee Act. Since then the number, which is not part of the overall ceiling, is determined annually. The 'quotas' for refugees are as follows : Eastern Hemisphere 1966 -78: 10,200 Western Hemisphere 1966 -76: 0 " " 1977 -78: 7,200 World 1979 : 50,000 1986 : 67,000 1993 : 116,000 1980 : 213,700 1987 : 70,000 1994 : 117,500 1981 : 217,000 1988 : 87,500 1995 : 111,000 1982 : 140,000 1989 : 116,500 1996 : 90,000 1983 : 90,000 1990 : 110,000 1997 : 78,000 1984 : 72,000 1991 : 116,000 1998 : 83,000 1985 1992: 123,500 The variable X a is defined as the refugee "quota" divided by the country population. Before 1979 it is calculated to produce a separate value for each hemisphere by using respective hemispheric populations. From 1980 the overall allocation was divided into regional totals. A separate value was therefore calculated for each region, and applied to all countries in that region.
Immigration Reform and Control Act: (X irc )
As regards permanent admissions, IRCA made two major provisions. The first was legalization of illegal immigrants who had resided in the US continuously since before 1982. After first applying for temporary status (during a window in 1987-8) these immigrants could gain permanent status after 18 months. The second granted temporary visas to seasonal agricultural workers (SAWs), previously working illegally, with the right to become permanent immigrants after one year. Further temporary visas were made available for new agricultural workers, with the right to become permanent after two years. The IRCA provisions are relevant here only insofar as they offered a new channel for permanent immigration. Most of the illegal immigrants eligible for adjustment under IRCA were from Mexico and Central America (especially the former), and the bulk of these adjustments took place in 1989-91.
Our variable X irc is derived from the number of illegal immigrants living in the United States in 1980 estimated by Warren and Passell (1987) , p. 380-1. Estimates for 1980 are appropriate given that legalizations applied to those living in the US since before 1982.The estimates are based on a comparison of census data for 1980 and measures of the stock of legal immigrants based on INS data. The total number of just over two million is considered as a lower bound. Figures are given for specific countries and for continental remainders; the latter were distributed across countries using 1980 population weights. The variable X irc was obtained by dividing the number of illegals thus calculated by the origin country population in 1990. It is applied only to the years 1989-91.
Backlog: (X b )
In 1995 the burden of dealing with adjustments shifted from consular offices to the INS, as a result of abolishing the requirement that eligible immigrants present in the US had to leave the country and apply for immigrant visas through consular offices abroad. As a result, between the end of fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1998 the backlog of applications pending a decision increased from 121,000 to 811,000. The INS estimates that, in the absence of the increase in the pending caseload, legal immigration would have been 110,000 to 140,000 higher for each of the years 1995 to 1998 (INS, 2000, p. 15) .
Our variable X b is simply a dummy for the years 1995-8.
E: The Balanced Panel
In our econometric work and in the simulations that follow, we use a balance panel of 81 countries across 28 years. Although there are about twice this number of source countries separately identified in the INS immigration series, the remainder were dropped from the sample because one or more of the explanatory variables was not available for some or all of the period. In cases where countries have split or amalgamated during the period, they have been re-aggregated to the combined total throughout. Thus for immigration and the foreign-born stocks, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union have been reassembled. East and West Germany are together throughout as are China and Taiwan. In these cases the economic and demographic variables used to explain immigration are aggregated using current population weights.
Panel A of Table A1 lists all the countries in the dataset by region. As panel B shows, these account for 82.5 percent of all immigration over the period. But, as reflected in panel C, under-representation is greater for some regions than others. This is especially important for Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East. Important countries that are ommited include; Vietnam, Iraq and Lebanon in Asia; Ethipoia, Somalia and Nigeria in Africa; Cuba and Haiti in the Caribbbean. 
